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Managers  are  being  challenged  by multiple  (and  diverse)  stakeholders,  which  have variety  of  expectations
and  informational  needs  about  their  ﬁrm’s  supply  chains.  Collectively,  these  expectations  and  needs  form
a multi-faceted  view  of  stakeholder  accountability,  namely  the  extent  to which  a ﬁrm  justiﬁes  behaviors
and  actions  across  its  extended  supply  chain  to stakeholders.  To date,  sustainable  supply  chain  manage-
ment  research  has  largely  focused  on monitoring  as  a  self-managed  set  of narrowly  deﬁned  evaluative
activities  employed  by ﬁrms  to  provide  stakeholder  accountability.  Nevertheless,  evidence  is emerging
that  ﬁrms  have  developed  a wide  variety  of monitoring  systems  in order  to  align with  stakeholders’
expectations  and  leverage  accountability  to  stakeholders.  Drawing  from  the  accounting  literature,  we
synthesize  a  model  that  proposes  how  ﬁrms  might  address  accountability  for  sustainability  issues  in
their  supply  chain.  At  its  core,  the  construct  of sustainable  evaluation  and  veriﬁcation  (SEV)  captures
three  interrelated  dimensions:  inclusivity,  scope,  and  disclosure.  These  dimensions  characterize  how
supply  chain  processes  might  identify  key measures,  collect  and  process  data,  and  ﬁnally,  verify  materi-
ality,  reliability  and  accuracy  of any  data  and resulting  information.  As  a result,  the  concept  of monitoring
is  signiﬁcantly  extended,  while  also  considering  how  different  stakeholders  can  play diverse,  active  roles
as metrics  are  established,  audits  are  conducted,  and  information  is  validated.  Also,  several  antecedents  of
SEV systems  are  explored.  Finally,  the means  by  which  an  SEV system  can  create  a competitive  advantage
are  investigated.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
The challenge to integrate environmental and social issues into
he management of supply chains has grown signiﬁcantly over the
ast two decades. To illustrate, Mattel initiated a massive recall of
roducts – made by a supplier in China – after discovering they con-
ained lead paint applied by a second-tier supplier (Story, 2007).
cDonald’s Europe had to address issues of soybean agriculture in
razil because Greenpeace reported that the ﬁrm’s sourcing prac-
ices contributed to the depletion of the rainforest (Stoll, 2009).
ore recently, Victoria’s Secret was involved in a scandal regard-
ng children picking cotton in Burkina Faso (Simpson, 2011). This
ew operating context is the cumulative result of diverse demands
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272-6963/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
/).license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
from multiple stakeholder groups including investors, consumers,
supply chain partners, legislators, and non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs).
It is not surprising that, in order to address the changing and
diverse concerns of a wide variety of stakeholders, ﬁrms have
adopted a plethora of practices, which in turn continue to evolve
over time. The initial focus on internal operations (Klassen and
Whybark, 1999) has broadened into a stronger external orienta-
tion (Gualandris and Kalchschmidt, 2014; Pagell and Wu,  2009). As
a result, many ﬁrms are now attempting to ensure that operations
and performance within their plants – as well as those managed by
partners operating upstream and downstream in the supply chain
– are more sustainable.
Overall, this evolution highlights the importance for ﬁrms
to address the diverse expectations and informational needs
of multiple stakeholders exposed to supply chain externalities
(Gonzalez-Benito et al., 2011; Hall and Vredenburg, 2003). Collec-
tively, these expectations and needs form a multi-faceted view of
stakeholder accountability,  namely the extent to which a ﬁrm jus-
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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iﬁes behaviors and actions across its extended supply chain to
takeholders (Parmigiani et al., 2011). To date, sustainable sup-
ly chain management (SSCM) research has largely focused on
onitoring as a set of activities employed by ﬁrms to account
or sustainable operations and performance in their supply chains
Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Vachon and Klassen, 2006). This
esearch, however, tends to presuppose that the “right” perfor-
ance goals and processes underlie any monitoring practice, with a
onolithic group of stakeholders advocating for similar outcomes.
nstead, evidence is emerging that ﬁrms can develop different
onitoring systems, which in turn, align to greater or lesser
xtent with stakeholders’ expectations (Global Reporting Initiative,
013b).
Moreover, it is well accepted that competitive advantages are
ossible by aligning supply chain processes with speciﬁc customer
egments; we propose that a similar advantage can emerge from
ddressing varying stakeholder concerns, but not necessarily all
qually. Any monitoring practice should take into account both
he multiple informational needs noted earlier, and the processes
y which those needs are met. Thus, our understanding of sus-
ainable monitoring must evolve to consider accounting principles
nd processes, particularly those pertaining to inclusive veriﬁca-
ion procedures (Edgley et al., 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Simnett
t al., 2009). The literature is only starting to develop an under-
tanding about how ﬁrm capabilities and supply chain structures
inder or enable monitoring practices to respond to stakeholders’
xpectations for material, accurate, reliable, complete and respon-
ive information, and potentially confer a competitive advantage
Vurro et al., 2009; Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012; Perego and Kolk,
012).
Responding to recent calls for a stronger focus on develop-
ng new models and including additional stakeholders in SSCM
esearch (Pagell and Shevchenko, 2014), this paper seeks to make
hree contributions. First, by leveraging concepts from the account-
ng literature, we explore the degree to which ﬁrms might address
takeholders’ expectations leading to a departure from narrower,
onventional views of sustainable monitoring. We  propose a
ulti-dimensional construct, termed sustainable evaluation and
eriﬁcation (SEV), that encompasses all activities that identify key
ustainability metrics; collect and process data; verify the reliabil-
ty and accuracy of any data and resulting information; assess the
elevancy of this information to multiple stakeholders; and subse-
uently disclose some or all of this information. Thus, we  seek to
ntegrate and extend the principles and processes embedded in the
ccounting literature and in such initiatives as the Global Reporting
nitiative (GRI) into earlier sustainable supply chain management
esearch.
Second, this conceptual development establishes a foundation
o examine a set of antecedents that inﬂuence the characteris-
ics of an SEV system. Speciﬁcally, prior research sheds some light
n the role of three main factors: ﬁrm capabilities, particularly in
ustainability-oriented practices (Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012;
erego and Kolk, 2012; Reed et al., 2009); expectations of highly
alient stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997; Parmigiani et al., 2011);
nd the degree of supply chain integration (Flynn et al., 2010; Kim
t al., 2011).
Finally, insights emerge from related literature and anecdotal
vidence about the means by which an SEV system is a criti-
al determinant of competitive advantage (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989;
gels-Zanden and Lindholm, 2014; Reed, 2008 Reed, 2008). A mon-
toring system that involves some stakeholder groups and looks
eeply into the supply chain can offer relevant insights into poten-
ial risks and inefﬁciencies. However, it is conceivable that this
ystem can develop too far, leading to potential misalignments
ith some stakeholders’ expectations that work against a ﬁrm’s
redibility and can undermine its success. For example, while Wal-ns Management 38 (2015) 1–13
Mart engages with environmental NGOs, academics, consumers,
and suppliers in an attempt to account for a wide range of environ-
mental externalities along its global operations, other legitimate
stakeholders would expect more accurate and responsive informa-
tion regarding overworked, underpaid and disrespected employees
working at different level of Wal-Mart’s supply chain. As a result,
environmental improvements are often dismissed as ‘greenwash-
ing’.
The remainder of this paper is structured into three major sec-
tions. First, based on SSCM and accounting literatures, a new more
nuanced, multi-dimensional deﬁnition of SEV is presented. Next,
we explore the role of three important factors that are expected to
inﬂuence the development of an SEV system. Finally, complemen-
tary propositions explore the potential competitive implications of
an SEV system.
2. Extending our conceptualization of monitoring
2.1. Monitoring and its shortcomings
Over the last two  decades, managerial and research atten-
tion about supply chains has gradually expanded to consider,
ﬁrst, environmental, and then societal aspects. Simultaneously,
discussions have broadened from a simpliﬁed ‘chain’ to a more
complicated ‘network’ of buying and supplying ﬁrms, also known
as an extended supply chain. In parallel, sustainable supply chain
management research is coalescing around a general conceptual-
ization of and need for monitoring (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010;
Locke et al., 2007; Vachon and Klassen, 2006), among other prac-
tices. Sustainable monitoring includes self-managed activities such
as establishing supplier evaluation criteria, gathering of supplier
information, and the appraisal of environmental and social per-
formance of incoming goods and the suppliers’ operations. These
activities aim to control inputs, production processes or outputs
through an arm’s-length practice that evaluates compliance with
a purchasing contract, “voluntary” code of conduct, certiﬁcation
system, or regulatory standard.
This conceptualization of sustainable monitoring, however,
presents several limitations. First, it tends to assume that data and
information coming from different nodes of the extended supply
chain are reliable and accurate. Recent scandals, instead, provide
evidence of the questionable claims passed along a multi-tier sup-
ply chain. For instance, Levi Strauss and Co. found pre-stamped time
cards at a factory in Bangladesh indicating the legal amount of hours
allowed (McCafferty, 2005). Simple inspections often miss serious
problems (Locke et al., 2007; Egels-Zandén and Lindholm, 2014):
two of the factories that collapsed in Rana Plaza (Bangladesh) had
recently passed audits commissioned by focal ﬁrms (Surowiecki,
2013). Thus, because supply chain partners appear to be quite adept
at gaming the system, monitoring practices are evolving to include
proper veriﬁcation of any data and resulting information (Gray,
2001; Manetti and Becatti, 2009; O’Dwyer et al., 2011).
Second, the existing conceptualization of sustainable monitor-
ing tends to focus on a small set of environmental and social
performance indicators (i.e., energy efﬁciency, pollutants, worker
health and safety, and child labor) when characterizing key
operations and main supply chain partners. Narrowly focused mon-
itoring, however, can overlook negative externalities that impact
multiple stakeholders, deﬁned as any group or individual who  can
affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objec-
tives (Freeman, 1984). Better scientiﬁc understanding and easier
stakeholder mobilization around environmental and social exter-
nalities gradually have compelled supply chain managers to justify
the way they interact with other ﬁrms in their supply chain, some-
times being held accountable for issues over which they have little
erations Management 38 (2015) 1–13 3
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irect control (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014; Parmigiani et al.,
011). For example, over the last decade, Apple has faced the rise of
ultiple important issues, from hazardous materials in electronics
evices, to labor exploitation issues in suppliers’ facilities, to con-
erns over “conﬂict minerals”. Thus, we must recognize that the
cope of any monitoring practice must be broadened and deep-
ned for those (but not all) issues valued by stakeholders (Adams
nd Evans, 2004; Ball et al., 2000; Gray, 2013).
Finally, the interaction among stakeholders and the ﬁrm is fun-
amentally changing based on concepts like “shared value” (Porter
nd Kramer, 2011), prompting the need for more nuanced research.
n the past, sustainable monitoring has been characterized as a
elf-managed set of evaluative activities. Recent cases, instead, pro-
ide evidence that several NGOs are now participating to some
egree in the evaluation of supply chain sustainability. For example,
oth Conservation International and Cooperative for Assistance and
elief Everywhere (CARE) work with Starbucks in the certiﬁcation
f its coffee supply chain. The expertise of some stakeholders can
e leveraged to construct more thoughtful sustainability objectives
Cooper and Owen, 2007; Edgley et al., 2010; O’Dwyer, 2011), and to
mplement sustainable practices in the supply chain (Manetti and
occafondi, 2012; McDonald and Young, 2012; Park and Brorson,
005). Accordingly, some stakeholders should be formally recog-
ized as potentially playing an integral role in monitoring, not
olely as an external party applying pressure to improve. Thus, focal
rms’ attention should concentrate on those stakeholders who can
ctively contribute to dialogue, and activities that generate a valid
nd reliable monitoring system (Edgley et al., 2010).
.2. Accounting points to a deeper set of interdependent processes
Certiﬁcation schemes and international standards are shap-
ng the environmental and social attributes of complex inter-ﬁrm
nteractions across the extended supply chain in product design,
rocess design, technology choices and management practices. For
xample, certiﬁcations such as Fairtrade for agricultural products,
nd Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) for harvesting of timber,
onsider speciﬁc environmental and social criteria related to
aw material supply. Integrative frameworks such as the Global
eporting Initiative (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013a) provide a
tructured method to report a variety of key environmental and
ocial indicators. Sustainable supply chain management research,
owever, continues to wrestle with how monitoring principles and
rocesses might be best aligned with such initiatives.
Monitoring systems can effectively combine evaluation –
ncompassing data collection using surveys, audits and data
nalysis techniques – with veriﬁcation,  namely the subsequent
pplication of techniques that scrutinize the materiality, reliabil-
ty and accuracy of any data and resulting information. Lamberton
2005) noted that surveys, audits and data analysis techniques
uch as sustainable cost accounting, natural capital inventory
ccounting, and full-cost accounting “are designed to account for
erformance evaluation relative to the goal assigned” to the ﬁrm
y its stakeholders. Then, veriﬁcation must follow, which enhances
the degree of conﬁdence” of the ﬁrm and its stakeholders about
he results of the evaluation against speciﬁc criteria (ISAE, 2011).
n 2012 over 46% of ﬁrms listed on GRI’s database had performed
ome form of veriﬁcation (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013b).
In practice, the evaluation process can vary considerably
etween ﬁrms and between supply chains, in terms of “how”
penly the process is managed, “what” environmental and social
ssues are covered, and “what” proportion of the information is ulti-
ately disclosed. Similarly, the veriﬁcation process might include
 varying range of stakeholders with different expectations and
nowledge about what data to collect, data quality, or both (Cooper
nd Owen, 2007; Edgley et al., 2010; Manetti and Toccafondi,Fig. 1. Inclusivity of a sustainable evaluation and veriﬁcation (SEV) system.
2012). Empirical observation also attests that the scope of ver-
iﬁcation activities is often too narrow, and the scrutiny and the
assurance statement might not reﬂect stakeholders’ informational
needs or the breadth of activities in question (Owen and O’Dwyer,
2005). Finally, varying degrees of stakeholder engagement are par-
tially reﬂected in the heterogeneity of ﬁrms’ disclosures, which
range from vague information to rich information that is relevant
and accessible to all stakeholders (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013;
Higgins and Walker, 2012).
As elaborated in the following sections, a synthesis of sustain-
able supply chain management and accounting literatures points to
three major dimensions characterizing evaluation and veriﬁcation
processes: inclusivity, scope and disclosure.
2.3. Inclusivity
Since the earliest theorizing about corporate social responsi-
bility (Wood, 1991), the stakeholder management literature has
emphasized that the process of addressing stakeholder concerns
about sustainability-related issues is at least as important as any
speciﬁc outcome. Although they provide little direction about the
nature of stakeholder engagement, standards and reporting frame-
works like ISO 26000, AA1000S, SA8000 and GRI also stress the
importance of including multiple stakeholders. Moreover, man-
agerial decision-making can beneﬁt from drawing on the views of
a wide range of stakeholders (Sarkis et al., 2010; Pagell and Wu,
2009). Thus, inclusivity refers to the degree to which a variety of
diverse stakeholder groups are engaged in the design and execu-
tion of sustainable evaluation and veriﬁcation processes (Ball et al.,
2000; Owen et al., 2001; Reed, 2008). Inclusivity is the ﬁrst dimen-
sion of an SEV system and is closely linked to external transparency,
deﬁned as the extent to which information about operations and
structures of a given supply chain is available to a variety of stake-
holders other than supply chain partners (Carter and Rogers, 2008).
As shown by Fig. 1, this deﬁnition of inclusivity results in a typology
based on a continuum from few to many stakeholders involved in
two tasks for which stakeholder participation is particularly impor-
tant, i.e., SEV design and SEV execution.
Inclusivity is low when focal ﬁrms walk alone (Ball et al., 2000;
Owen et al., 2001; Reed, 2008). While the number of sustainabil-
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ty reports issued by ﬁrms has grown rapidly, few are derived
rom truly inclusive processes (Edgley et al., 2010; Manetti and
occafondi, 2012). In many cases, in fact, SEV’s processes are man-
ged in a coordinated fashion between auditors (i.e., who conducts
udits on the ﬁeld), assurors (i.e., who validate the information
hat is going to be disclosed) and the focal ﬁrm (i.e., the report-
ng organization). For example, Kraft and Chiquita selected and
orked mainly with Rainforest Alliance, and chose to depend on
ts evaluation and veriﬁcation services, without undergoing further
onsultation with other stakeholder groups. While operationally
xpedient, this practice presents a modest degree of independence
Ball et al., 2000; Gray, 2013; King, 2007), i.e., the agent (audi-
or) is commissioned not by the ultimate user of the information
investors, communities, other NGOs), but instead, by the principal
the focal ﬁrm).
At high levels of inclusivity, focal ﬁrms engage broadly with a
ariety of diverse stakeholder groups playing different decisional
nd operational roles in SEV’s processes (Ball et al., 2000; Owen
t al., 2001; Reed, 2008). As to the SEV design, focal ﬁrms may  obtain
dvice from different individuals, groups or organizations, who are
onsulted to clarify the range of relevant environmental and soci-
tal externalities to be evaluated and veriﬁed, not only internal to
he ﬁrm, but also across the extended supply chain (Adams and
vans, 2004 Global Reporting Initiative, 2013a,b). Then, various
takeholder groups can assist with the implementation of audits
hroughout the extended supply chain on behalf of the ﬁrm (Park
nd Brorson, 2005). Similarly, stakeholders may  also be included
s independent assurors, which direct focus groups, take notes,
ncourage managerial response and ﬁnally highlight their ﬁndings
n a public report (King, 2007; Reed et al., 2009). In this sense, inclu-
ivity is instrumental in designing and executing evaluation and
eriﬁcation processes, enabling a more complete and responsive
ortrayal of outcomes that stakeholders believe to be critical.
To illustrate, Starbucks and Unilever have worked with a vari-
ty of local farmers and ﬁshermen, local cooperatives and societal
roups such as Conservation International, CARE, Oxfam and World
ildlife Fund (WWF)  to prioritize a list of relevant issues to be eval-
ated and veriﬁed in their supply chains (Argenti, 2004; Austin,
000; Wymer  and Samu, 2003 Austin, 2000; Wymer and Samu,
003). These stakeholders also can work in the ﬁeld to gather,
rocess and verify data related to product responsibility, social
onditions and biodiversity along global operations (e.g., Smedley,
013). Starbucks and Unilever, however, have chosen not to work to
he same degree with other stakeholders that are focused around
ssues of recycling, waste and energy management; these stake-
olders and sustainability issues were considered less material
rom an accountability perspective (e.g., Lubin, 2014).
.4. Scope
The second dimension, scope, captures the range of issues and
etwork of supply chain partners covered by an SEV system, i.e.,
he “space” encompassed by evaluation and veriﬁcation processes.
o begin, management must prioritize the nature and number of
ifferent environmental and social issues to be included in evalu-
tion and veriﬁcation processes (Wood, 1991). For example, data
athering systems and tools may  differ in the way they use and
ntegrate product-based (e.g., BPA-free) and process-based (e.g.,
SC-certiﬁed) indicators pertaining to different sustainability areas
uch as environment (biodiversity, air and water pollution, energy,
ecycling), decent working conditions (health and safety, training
nd education), and human rights (child labor, discrimination).Then, the supply chain literature classically differentiates
etween ﬁrms based on their relative position in the extended
upply chain. Furthermore, control over environmental and social
xternalities tends to vary based on the position in the supplyns Management 38 (2015) 1–13
chain and the number of hand-offs between a supplier and its (in)
direct customer (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Kim et al., 2011).
For example, IBM rolled out its environmental and social manage-
ment system to approximately 30,000 Tier-1 suppliers in 2010. This
system required those suppliers to cascade this program to their
own  suppliers who  indirectly provide materials to IBM (Orts and
Spigonardo, 2012). Because of the large number of goods and ser-
vices provided by many suppliers, initial efforts to evaluate and
verify sustainability were concentrated on a subset of key sup-
ply chain partners. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that a
ﬁrm’s evaluation of toxic substances might ﬂow through multiple
tiers upstream and downstream in the supply chain (e.g., Mattel’s
product contamination); in contrast, analysis of the carbon foot-
print for the supply chain of some ﬁrms might be narrowed to a
single critical tier, namely energy suppliers.
Thus, the scope of an SEV system varies with the number of
issues covered and the number of connections between supply
chain partners considered during any data collection, processing
and validation. Scope fosters or constrains internal transparency,
deﬁned as the extent to which actors within the supply chain have
access to information useful to manage their operating perfor-
mance (Barratt and Oke, 2007).
2.5. Disclosure
Since their ﬁrst appearance, annual sustainability reports
have represented the primary means to address stakeholders’
informational needs concerning ﬁrms’ environmental and social
performance (Gray et al., 2006). Through such reports, ﬁrms
can improve stakeholders’ understanding of complex issues, and
reduce potential bias by offering a more nuanced explanation. For
example, when disclosing information, ﬁrms can present problems
in the context of real-world situations, and prompt stakehold-
ers to critically review their pre-conceived impressions, so as
to make better-informed decisions (Thomson and Bebbington,
2005). Graphics and consolidated data tables can appeal to reason,
and facilitate understanding and persuasion (Higgins and Walker,
2012). Disclosure can occur at multiple stages of SEV processes (e.g.,
initially, scope of data collection; and later, speciﬁc quantitative
ﬁndings), while also offering a means for examination and com-
parison (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013a,b). Therefore, both the
design and the execution of evaluation and veriﬁcation processes
can be documented and substantiated by evidence, which improves
the perception of trustworthiness of the report’s ﬁndings (Higgins
and Walker, 2012).
Studies have shown that ﬁrms can strategically choose stake-
holder management tactics that can lead to gaps between actions
and communications (Weaver et al., 1999), or between gathered
information and disclosed information (Ball et al., 2000). For exam-
ple, focal ﬁrms might refrain from reporting information about
internal operations and supply chain partners, or choose to com-
municate information that is material only to a limited set of
stakeholders. A well-known example is Apple, which held back
information about the identity of its key suppliers for a long time
(Duhigg and Barboza, 2012). Although releasing limited informa-
tion could be defended for strategic reasons, such as avoiding
knowledge spillovers, stakeholders perceived less accountability.
In summary, disclosure refers to the degree to which data
and information about SEV’s processes and outcomes is offered
in an accessible, comprehensible manner to stakeholders. Thus,
disclosure varies from little information to complete and clear
information on SEV’s processes and outcomes. We posit that
disclosure, by efﬁciently revealing material information publicly,
complements inclusivity in fostering external transparency of an
extended supply chain.
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.6. Towards an integrative view
Collectively, a synthesis of related literatures indicates that a
inimum of three underlying dimensions – inclusivity, scope and
isclosure – collectively characterize a system or set of interde-
endent and sequential processes that evaluate and verify the
nvironmental and social performance of an extended supply chain.
s summarized in Table 1, evaluation and veriﬁcation can be
esigned and executed by the focal ﬁrm alone, or alternatively,
ogether with a variety of diverse stakeholder groups. Furthermore,
he collection of data, subsequent validation, and aggregation into
ey performance indicators might encompass, to varying degrees,
ifferent facets of sustainability. One focal ﬁrm might concentrate
n environmental aspects characterizing products with limited
nformation released to customers, while another might empha-
ize social issues in operations of its ﬁrst-tier suppliers, and offer
etailed information veriﬁed by a third-party.
Given that inclusivity is viewed as foundational for building
ransparency between a focal ﬁrm and its stakeholders (Carter and
ogers, 2008; Edgley et al., 2010; Reed, 2008), we propose that
nclusivity is intimately linked to scope and, indirectly, to ﬁnal dis-
losure. Also, we propose that an SEV system directly determines
perceived’ stakeholder accountability deﬁned as stakeholders’ per-
eptions of the extent to which a ﬁrm justiﬁes behaviors and actions
cross its extended supply chain. Indeed, as stakeholders actively
articipate in SEV’s processes, they can appreciate the legitimacy of
ach other’s views and get material information directly; as scope
ncreases, internal transparency is fostered and the ﬁrm’s efforts to
isseminate information in a complete and clear manner also can
mprove. Finally, as disclosure increases, external transparency is
mproved further and stakeholders might perceive the ﬁrm as more
een to offer accessible and comprehensible information about
upply chain externalities. For example, Corporate Knights, a Cana-
ian media company, ranks the top-100 World’s Most Sustainable
irms based on 10 environmental, social and governance perfor-
ance metrics. When a ﬁrm provides information for all 10 metrics,
orporate Knights rewards it with a favorable accountability score
Coster, 2010) because of its ability and willingness to justify oper-
tions and performance.
Nevertheless, more might not be universally better: as inclusiv-
ty increases, an inﬂection point might be reached where complex
nteractions impede the ﬁrm from clearly understanding and
ddressing the perspectives of some primary or fringe stakehold-
rs (Reed, 2008). Similarly, if a ﬁrm collects and discloses too
uch information in an attempt to satisfy disparate stakeholders’
emands and impress stakeholders, it is possible that perceived
ccountability might suffer, particularly if accuracy and reliability
re legitimately constrained (e.g., scientiﬁc limitations). Consider
tarbucks: although inclusivity and disclosure exceed those of
ompetitors such as Kraft, the scope of issues has been astutely
onstrained to focus primarily on coffee sourcing, thereby avoid-
ng deteriorations of ‘perceived’ stakeholder accountability. This
iscussion leads to the following propositions:
Proposition 1a (P1a): Sustainable evaluation and veriﬁcation sys-
ems vary between ﬁrms and between supply chains based on their
nclusivity, scope and disclosure.
P1b: As inclusivity increases, scope and disclosure of an SEV system
end to increase.
P1c: As inclusivity, scope and disclosure of an SEV system increase,
erceived stakeholder accountability tends to initially increase, and
hen decrease (i.e., curvilinear relationship).
Overall, this multi-dimensional deﬁnition of an SEV system
nriches our conceptualization of monitoring in at least three ways.
irst, a complex combination of evaluation and veriﬁcation pro-
esses can underlie the monitoring practice. Second, the ideal
erformance goals and the best processes are not deﬁned in isola-ns Management 38 (2015) 1–13 5
tion by the focal ﬁrm; instead, these must be designed and updated
by integrating the views and needs of some stakeholder groups.
Third, a few stakeholders can be actively involved in the execution
of SEV’s processes, thus potentially contributing capabilities to a
more comprehensive and reliable SEV, rather than only applying
pressure or imposing constraints.
3. Antecedents of sustainable evaluation and veriﬁcation
A synthesis of sustainable supply chain management and
accounting literatures points toward at least three antecedents
that inﬂuence the development of an SEV system, and are likely
to inﬂuence how monitoring in supply chains might occur: ﬁrm
capabilities, stakeholder salience and supply chain integration.
3.1. Firm capabilities
Prior research has shown that inclusivity and scope of veriﬁ-
cation processes, as well as the amount of sustainability-related
information disclosed to the public, vary considerably between
ﬁrms and between supply chains. Some have suggested a resource-
based explanation for such variability based on capabilities
(Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012; Perego and Kolk, 2012; Reed et al.,
2009). According to this literature, two  general types of capa-
bilities are relevant for an SEV system: relational and technical,
detailed below. Their presence might not be sufﬁcient to ensure
high inclusivity, large scope and extensive disclosure, but their
absence hinders, retards or even constrains the development of
these dimensions.
Broadly, relational capabilities include the ability to design con-
tractual and informal mechanisms to share information, increase
commitment, and generate common goals between different enti-
ties (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). In the context of SEV, however,
relational capabilities refer more speciﬁcally to ambidexterity in
dealing with a variety of diverse stakeholder groups (Webb et al.,
2010). In order to establish inclusive systems, ﬁrms must be able to
(i) identify individuals, groups or organizations exposed to supply
chain externalities and categorize them according to their values
and capabilities; (ii) establish two-way communication with them
and foster lateral discussion to prioritize goals and design interven-
tions; (iii) coordinate their work in the ﬁeld for the achievement
of common objectives (Adams and Evans, 2004; Perego and Kolk,
2012; Reed et al., 2009). Accordingly, drawing from case studies,
Pagell and Wu (2009) found that sustainability champions were
able to leverage weak ties with a variety of non-traditional supply
chain members (NGOs) to collect valuable information about their
supply chains. Consider also the case of Starbucks: the ﬁrm was
able to identify diverse stakeholder groups, use open discussions
centered on common values and beliefs to align their objectives,
and ﬁnally direct work so as to create a truly inclusive system able
to promote sustainability throughout the extended supply chain
(Argenti, 2004; Austin, 2000).
In contrast, technical capabilities generally are linked to orga-
nizational routines derived from an understanding of the science
and know-how involved in distributing, producing and sourcing
goods and services (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). Here, techni-
cal capabilities refer more speciﬁcally to understanding how to
design and execute audit assignments, including knowledge about
issue-speciﬁc measurement methods, scrutinizing techniques and
reporting guidelines (Gray and Collison, 2002; Adams and Evans,
2004; Lamberton, 2005). Enlarging the scope of an SEV system
requires management to combine, for example, input-output anal-
ysis to evaluate the physical ﬂow of materials, energy inputs, and
goods and waste outputs, along with qualitative indicators captur-
ing health and safety in supply chain operations. The accounting
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Table 1
Interdependent processes and dimensions of an SEV system.
Dimensions
Inclusivity Scope Disclosure
(Walk alone
to Engage broadly,
see Fig. 1)
Range
(Narrow
to Broad set of
issues)
Network
(Few organizations
to Extended supply
chain)
(Little information
to Complete and
clear information)
Evaluation
(Gathering data;
aggregating
information;
understanding
impact.)
Data gathering and
processing can be
designed and
executed by the
focal ﬁrm alone or
by the focal ﬁrm
together with a
large variety of
diverse
stakeholders.
Data gathered and
processed can
describe
environmental
and/or social
performance
characterizing
products and/or
processes.
Data gathered and
processed can
cover operations
administered by
the focal ﬁrm and
few key partners or
by all the
inter-related
organizations
operating in the
extended supply
chain.
Some or all of the
information about
the evaluation
process and its
outcomes can be
retained internally,
or alternatively,
can be made fully
accessible, and
comprehensible to
stakeholders.
Veriﬁcation
(Assessing
materiality,
reliability,
accuracy,
of  any data and
resulting
information.)
Assurance can be
designed and
executed by the
focal ﬁrm alone or
by the focal ﬁrm
together with a
large variety of
diverse
Assurance can
regard
environmental
and/or social
performance
characterizing
products and/or
processes.
Assurance can
cover operations
administered by
the focal ﬁrm and
few key partners or
by all the
inter-related
organizations
Some or all of the
information about
the assurance
process and its
outcomes can be
retained internally,
or alternatively,
can be made fully
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iterature suggests that improving accountability is often ham-
ered by the lack of knowledge about what constitutes adequate
PIs for capturing social and environmental issues, as well as “best
ractice” assurance procedures (Gray and Collison, 2002; Adams
nd McNicholas, 2007; Perego and Kolk, 2012). Thus, the following
ropositions arise:
P2a. As a ﬁrm’s relational capabilities increase, the inclusivity of its
EV system increases. Indirectly, scope and disclosure also increase.
P2b. As a ﬁrm’s technical capabilities increase, the scope of its SEV
ystem increases. Indirectly, disclosure also increases.
.2. Stakeholder salience
Environmental and social accounting has recognized that multi-
le stakeholder groups have different competing interests (Edgley
t al., 2010). Also, it has been debated that some stakeholders may
e unwilling or unable to clearly articulate their expectations and
nformational needs beforehand, as these are context and situation
peciﬁc (Hall and Vredenburg, 2003). For example, in 2007, Apple’s
mage was undermined by the Greenpeace’s campaign against haz-
rdous materials in electronics devices (Greenpeace, 2007). In 2011,
hina Labor Watch contested the computer ﬁrm aggressively for
erceived labor exploitation issues (Duhigg and Barboza, 2012). The
ame year the Chinese Institute of Public and Environmental Affair
aised concerns about Apple’s carbon footprint and environmen-
al pollution violations by supply chain partners. More recently,
he U.S. government and other NGOs (Friends of the Earth, 2012)
aised concerns over “conﬂict minerals” and tin mining practices.
Some evidence is emerging about how supply chain theory (and
ractice) accounts for these differences. In order to establish some
ense of priority, stakeholder salience indicates how important a
articular stakeholder is for a ﬁrm and the management of its
upply chain (Mitchell et al., 1997; Parmigiani et al., 2011). A stake-
older’s salience tends to increase with its potential to impose its
ill (power), the perception of its action to be proper and desirable
legitimacy) and the extent to which its claim should be addressedoperating in the
extended supply
chain.
accessible,
comprehensible to
stakeholders.
immediately (urgency). As illustrated by the Apple case, as a ﬁrm’s
supply chain generates negative externalities, such as larger car-
bon footprint and social costs, one or more groups of stakeholders
can respond by increasing pressure at one or more tiers of the
supply chain. A focal ﬁrm’s legitimacy – the appropriateness of
its actions within an established set of regulations, norms, values
or beliefs (Suchman, 1995) – can be threatened by highly salient
stakeholders, as these groups leverage their own  legitimacy to crit-
icize a ﬁrm’s supply chain and make claims that must be addressed
urgently. In response, ﬁrms might increase inclusivity to these
stakeholders and increase the amount of information collected and
disclosed (Jones et al., 2013). For example, some electronic ﬁrms,
such as HP, Philips and Samsung, have interacted with a variety of
stakeholders to develop materiality matrixes and to conduct mon-
itoring activities globally (e.g., Philips, 2012). Disclosure also has
been improved: in 2012, for the ﬁrst time, Apple released a list
identifying its key suppliers (Duhigg and Barboza, 2012).
Salience does more than just motivate managers to justify their
actions and behaviors to a subset of relevant stakeholders; it can be
instrumental to design and execute SEV processes that can respond
to the expectations and informational needs of a broader audience.
At least in part, salience can arise from capabilities stakeholders
have developed that help legitimize their own actions (King, 2007;
O’Dwyer et al., 2011); such capabilities can then assist ﬁrms when
developing SEV processes. To begin, consider such well-known
societal groups as the China Labour Watch, Oxfam, Greenpeace
and Greening Australia. Some might be only accredited ‘observers’
that serve as early warning mechanisms (Table 2); however, others
provide analysis and expertise, and help implement and monitor
international agreements (Edwards, 2000). Because of their abil-
ity to perform effective and timely auditing assignments, some
stakeholders can be viewed as ‘counselors’. According to Oxfam
(2013), its involvement in Unilever’s supply chain has been nec-
essary because self-assessments and site visits performed by the
focal ﬁrm and its accountants were not always sensitive to worker
social vulnerability.
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Table  2
Different Roles for Stakeholders in SEV.
Relational capabilities
Low High
Low Observer
– serve as an
early warning
mechanism
(e.g., China
Labor Watch)
Coordinator
– build and direct
coalitions of multiple
stakeholders
(e.g., Greenpeace)
High Counselor
– perform
effective and
timely auditing
Partner
– play multiple other
roles with shared sense
of  purpose
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(e.g., Greening
Australia)
Yet, other stakeholders build and coordinate coalitions of con-
umers, civil society groups and governments. Greenpeace, for
xample, starts its campaigns by engaging with other societal
roups to discuss material issues and explore potential solutions.
nly later does it target speciﬁc industrial actors, often disrupt-
ng operations and hurting performance in supply chains, to bring
ttention to speciﬁc shortcomings that it has chosen to highlight.
hether antagonistic or collaborative in attitude (Argenti, 2004),
he relational capabilities of a few stakeholders enable them to
otentially play the role of ‘coordinators’.
Finally, some stakeholder groups develop a comprehensive set
f capabilities that can make them strong candidates for a deeper
artnership with a focal ﬁrm. Such a stakeholder group must have
oth relational capabilities (e.g., sufﬁcient ambidexterity to deal
ith a variety of other stakeholder groups) and technical capa-
ilities (e.g., perform evaluative activities). To illustrate, consider
reening Australia (McDonald and Young, 2012). On the one hand,
his NGO was able to develop a thorough and effective engagement
lan to prioritize and address the needs of various stakeholders
uch as Alcoa, its employees, local communities and government
gencies. On the other, it delivered high-quality environmental
uditing in the execution phase of this multi-stakeholder initiative.
P3a: As stakeholder salience increases, inclusivity, scope and dis-
losure of an SEV system increase.
P3b. Highly salient stakeholders can potentially play four major
oles in an SEV system based on their technical and relational capabil-
ties.
Nonetheless, highly salient stakeholders do more than just
ffect the focal ﬁrm directly, as their importance also can inﬂu-
nce general expectations about materiality, reliability, accuracy,
ompleteness and responsiveness of a ﬁrm anticipated by other
ndividual stakeholders, termed ‘expected’ stakeholder accountabil-
ty.  As the case of Apple illustrates, the supply chain of some ﬁrms
an be held to a higher standard than others. Thus, consistent with
elated literatures (Gray et al., 2006; Parmigiani et al., 2011), legit-
mate and urgent claims by powerful stakeholders tend to broadly
nﬂuence the expectations and informational needs of other stake-
olders, including consumers and investors.
.3. Supply chain integration
Supply chain integration considers three inter-related dimen-
ions, namely customer, internal and supplier integration (Flynn
t al., 2010), and both customer and supplier integration (i.e.,
xternal integration) have implications for SEV. When consider-
ng an extended supply chain as a single system based on both
aterial and informational ﬂows, and contractual relationships,
xternal integration represents the degree to which sourcing-
anufacturing-distributing processes across multiple tiers arens Management 38 (2015) 1–13 7
structured, linked together and synchronized (Stank et al., 2001).
External integration engenders interconnectedness between ﬁrms
within the extended supply chain (Kim et al., 2011), thus affect-
ing their strategic responses to competitive concerns, threats and
opportunities (Oliver, 1991; Vurro et al., 2009).
A focal ﬁrm might decide to develop its SEV system to inﬂu-
ence stakeholders’ perceptions and obtain stakeholders’ support
(Eisenhardt, 1989); incentives for greater inclusivity, scope and
disclosure, however, can change according to the degree of sup-
ply chain integration. Higher degrees of interconnectedness tend
to simplify the clear identiﬁcation of customers and suppliers,
reduce information asymmetries throughout the supply chain and
increase mutual control (Flynn et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011). For
these reasons, as supply chain integration increases, focal ﬁrms
can efﬁciently expand the volume of information gathered and dis-
closed (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Klassen and Vereecke, 2012;
Vachon and Klassen, 2006). Conversely, with less connected pro-
cesses for sourcing, manufacturing and distributing, traceability
is hampered (i.e., higher information cost and poorer information
quality) and stakeholders outside the supply chain have difﬁculty
assigning clear liability and taking action to punish when perceived
misconduct occurs (Barnett, 2014). To illustrate, although the U.S.
government and NGOs are raising concerns about “conﬂict min-
erals” and tin mining practices, electronics ﬁrms are resisting the
evaluation and tracking of their sources (Friends of the Earth, 2012).
Gathering and verifying such information can be very expensive,
and has questionable accuracy and reliability because of spot mar-
kets and co-mingled supplies.
Nevertheless, as the degree of interconnectedness between sup-
ply chain partners increases, a point might be reached where
inclusivity, scope and disclosure start to diminish. If taken to the
extreme of captive supplier/manufacturer/distributor or vertical
integration – for a whole variety of competitive reasons unre-
lated to sustainability – objectivity can be lost, and opportunistic
behaviors can emerge. For example, in highly interconnected chains
with higher risk of opportunistic behaviour by supply chain part-
ners (Hirsch and Meyer, 2010), focal ﬁrms might be less likely to
objectively acknowledge deterioration, detect cheating and con-
sider alternative views (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Villena et al.,
2011). Also, inclusivity is reduced, as it can increase the likeli-
hood that violations or poor performance of supply chain partners
is revealed publicly (O’Dwyer et al., 2011 pp. 50). Therefore, at
extreme levels of interconnectedness, focal ﬁrms are expected to
avoid situations where a large variety of stakeholders (beyond
customers and suppliers) actively participate at the design and
execution of SEV processes. For example, the coffee-supply chain
in which Kraft operates is well interconnected, thus monitoring
could be facilitated (Parmigiani et al., 2011; Kolk, 2013). Neverthe-
less, Kraft’s inclusivity is limited, evaluation is focused solely on
environmental issues, and disclosure is inconsistent.
P4: As supply chain integration increases, inclusivity, scope and
disclosure of an SEV system are expected to initially increase, and then
decrease (i.e., curvilinear relationship).
4. Outcomes of sustainable evaluation and veriﬁcation
While a wide set of outcomes could conceivably be linked to
SEV systems, we  will delineate and explore how SEV systems can
directly and indirectly spur three distinct outcomes: risk avoidance,
efﬁciency, and stakeholder credibility. Conceptually, the model
presented in Fig. 2 suggests the existence of two  complemen-
tary paths. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 clarify how an SEV system can
objectively yield risk avoidance and efﬁciency. Then, Section 4.3
presents the align-with-expectations logic as the basis of the indi-
rect, perceptual path. Finally, Section 4.4 explains how alignment
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etween ‘perceived’ and ‘expected’ accountability translates into
takeholder credibility.
.1. Risk avoidance
In the context of supply chain management, risk has primarily
een addressed as potential negative variation in the distribution
f possible supply chain outcomes (Jüttner et al., 2003), based on
he likelihood and magnitude of impact. Operational risks (Lewis,
003) related to delays, distortions and disruptions are among
he most studied categories of risk in the literature (Talluri et al.,
013). Delays and distortions can be viewed as recurrent risks
hat can occur when one or more parameters within the sup-
ly chain system, such as lead times and order sizes, stray from
heir expected value. In contrast, disruptions occur when the
upply chain is radically and unexpectedly upset through non-
vailability of resources or capabilities, such as production or
ransportation failures (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). Applied to sus-
ainability, such risks can encompass, for example, the availability
f scarce and non-renewable resources, product safety, or alter-
atively, environmental and social harm caused by inattention or
pportunism.
Engagement with some stakeholders can provide an early
arning system for emerging sustainability risks, anticipating
nexpected negative outcomes before they occur (Manetti and
occafondi, 2012; Reed, 2008). Also, consistent with cases such
s Starbucks and Unilever (e.g., Smedley, 2013), audit processes
xecuted by independent NGOs and unions throughout the sup-
ly chain are more likely to identify abuses and violations in the
orkplace (Egels-Zanden and Lindholm, 2014). Then, as an SEV sys-
em covers a wider range of issues and looks more deeply into the
xtended supply chain, it can yield new insights into potential risks.
or instance, Puma has developed an Environmental Proﬁt & Loss
E-P&L) system to quantify direct sustainability externalities, as
ell as those of its suppliers (Balch, 2012). This accounting enabled
uma to map  the water intensity of its raw materials against regions
here availability of water is limited, either now or possibly in the
uture.
P5a. As inclusivity and scope of an SEV system increase, potential
nvironmental and social risks are increasingly recognized.
Because potentially relevant risks are identiﬁed before problems
ccur, brand value is preserved. Moreover, risk avoidance also cany to stakeholders: An integrative view.
generate unexpected opportunities for success (Pettit et al., 2013);
for instance, in the aftermath of the massive toy recall by Mattel
in 2007, Lego and other competitors faced an opportunity to ﬁll
unmet demand and gain new consumers. In other words, being
able to avoid sustainability-related delays, distortions and disrup-
tions might offer ﬁrms an opportunity to steal market share from
competitors.
4.2. Efﬁciency
Taken one step further, not only are risks identiﬁed, but inef-
ﬁciencies also are uncovered. For example, Puma’s E-P&L allowed
the ﬁrm to more efﬁciently use natural resources, yielding a cost
savings of D 145 million (Balch, 2012). By increasing inclusivity, a
focal ﬁrm can leverage the ability of some stakeholders to fulﬁll
speciﬁc evaluative tasks, thereby beneﬁting from reliable and rela-
tively inexpensive information over global supply chain operations.
The participation of some stakeholders also might yield a richer set
of ideas and options resulting in lower cost solutions (Reed, 2008).
Although an SEV system might yield greater supply chain efﬁ-
ciency, complex interactions make speciﬁc outcomes difﬁcult to
predict. For example, the inclusion of diverse stakeholders in an SEV
system can be time-consuming and costly; participatory processes
can likely become “talking shops” that delay decisive action (Reed,
2008), especially if some stakeholders lack sufﬁcient expertise or
knowledge to fully engage in highly technical debates (Edgley
et al., 2010). Also, an SEV’s large scope might not result directly in
enhanced productivity, as externalities are internalized, but could
still be pursued in an attempt to satisfy the stakeholder demands
(Sarkis et al., 2010). To illustrate, the cost of tracing the sources
and uses of “conﬂict materials” by approximately 6000 publicly
traded ﬁrms has been estimated at $3 to $4 billion initially, with on-
going annual costs between $207 million to $609 million annually
(Davidoff, 2012). Thus, a non-linear relationship is expected:
P5b. As inclusivity and scope of an SEV system increase, efﬁciency
is expected to initially increase (i.e., low-hanging fruit), and then
decrease (i.e., curvilinear relationship).
Interestingly, efﬁciency gains might then provide opportunities
to compete as a low cost provider or pursue more aggressive grow-
ing strategies. To illustrate, Coca-Cola achieved a 20% reduction of
water and energy consumption per unit product during the last
decade by having some stakeholders develop and report speciﬁc
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etrics to track resource consumption in the supply chain (Kumar
t al., 2012). This change allowed Coca-Cola to maintain market
eadership and satisfactory ﬁnancial performance, despite seriously
uffering from a series of large acquisitions occurring at the same
ime.
.3. Aligning perceptions with expectations of stakeholder
ccountability
Besides the importance of objective data from the SEV sys-
em, stakeholder theorists argue that a ﬁrm’s success depends
artly on conforming to the expectations and informational needs
f stakeholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al.,
997). First, it has been suggested that a ﬁrm should concentrate
ts sustainable actions around issues and operations dictated by
ighly salient stakeholders, so as to reduce the imbalance or diver-
ence between “what a ﬁrm does” and “what a ﬁrm should do”
ccording to the opinion of its diverse stakeholders (González-
enito et al., 2011; Gray, 2013; Iansen-Rogers and Oelschlaegel,
005). GRI’s (2013b) latest revision, similarly, dictates that a ﬁrm
hould evaluate and communicate issues that substantively inﬂu-
nce the understanding and decisions of its stakeholders. The GRI
ormat aligns well with an accounting deﬁnition of materiality, i.e.,
he extent to which disclosed data is relevant and adequate for
ey stakeholders to make proper judgments about the ﬁrm (Gray,
001).
Second, some stakeholder groups have expectations about who
hould be consulted, and how a ﬁrm should account for its acts,
missions and risks (Adams and Evans, 2004; Gray, 2013; Iansen-
ogers and Oelschlaegel, 2005). For instance, NGOs expect their
pinions over the reliability and accuracy of evaluation processes
o be highly regarded by ﬁrms and inform the design of future
ractice (Edgley et al., 2010; Manetti and Becatti, 2009; Owen and
’Dwyer, 2005). Finally, the accounting literature goes even fur-
her, indicating that fully addressing stakeholders’ informational
eeds also entails an obligation of completeness, namely reporting
all” relevant information, and responsiveness, or adapting to cur-
ent and evolving demands (Adams and Evans, 2004; Cooper and
wen, 2007; O’Dwyer, 2011). In other words, a focal ﬁrm also must
perate in order to ﬁll “the gap between provision [of informa-
ion] and needs [for information]” (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013;
ansen-Rogers and Oelschlaegel, 2005).
Thus, these literatures suggest that when an SEV system works
o increasingly align perceptions with expectations of stakeholder
ccountability, a ﬁrm can gain additional competitive advan-
age. This align-with-expectations logic highlights the point that
hether a focal ﬁrm succeeds is not based only on gathering and
isclosing objective data, but also on the alignment between per-
eptions and expectations of multiple, individual stakeholders. For
xample, a stakeholder group might be very satisﬁed with an SEV
ystem that provides limited accountability, if this group believes
hat this degree aligns well with its expectations and informational
eeds.
For example, environmentalists and activist athletes are enthu-
iastic about Patagonia’s tightly focused monitoring system: the
rm is taking advantage of its well-interconnected network of
lothing manufacturers and its own technical capabilities to con-
truct the Higg Index, a very speciﬁc measure of the environmental
mpact of its textile supply chain, which results will be publicly dis-
losed (Chouinard, 2013). Conversely, another stakeholder group
ay be dissatisﬁed with such an SEV system that is perceived to
ffer accurate and reliable accounts if this group still believes that
peciﬁc concerns are not adequately considered. To illustrate, Wal-
art engages with several stakeholders and tries to account for
 wide range of environmental metrics such as carbon emissions,
nergy consumption and waste disposal in its global operations.ns Management 38 (2015) 1–13 9
However, little material and responsive information is reported
about overworked, underpaid and disrespected employees work-
ing at different levels of its supply chain. Some NGOs interpret
this misalignment as “green washing” (Mitchell, 2012). Sometimes
termed the self-promoter paradox, this phenomenon is one of the
causes of widespread mistrust between focal ﬁrms and their stake-
holders (Walker and Wan, 2012).
As previously discussed, however, a wide variety of factors can
potentially impede a ﬁrm’s willingness or efforts to increasingly
align perceptions with expectations of stakeholder accountabil-
ity. Limited ﬁrm capabilities and complex supply chain structures
might inhibit the development of an SEV system, constraining any
efforts to elevate perceived stakeholder accountability. For exam-
ple, limited relational capabilities can impede effective engagement
and communication with diverse stakeholders, or a deﬁcit of tech-
nical capabilities might constrain the scope of evaluation and
veriﬁcation processes to a few environmental or social issues
covering a few key suppliers. While likely less common, a ﬁrm
might actually over-achieve with its SEV system, presumably in
an attempt to satisfy disparate stakeholders’ demands or pursue
its own  strategic intents.
4.4. From alignment to stakeholder credibility
Credibility is high when an information source is fair, tells the
whole story, is unbiased, accurate, can be trusted and responds to
the receiver’s needs (Dando and Swift, 2003; Adams and Evans,
2004). Credibility has both objective and subjective components:
while established information reliability and accuracy is important,
individual stakeholder groups can adopt different views about the
conditions that must be satisﬁed in order to perceive reporting by
a ﬁrm as credible. As illustrated in the earlier sections, different
groups of stakeholders have varying interpretations of what the
“whole story” might be and of how it should be told.
Freeman (1984) (p. 162) proposed that ﬁrms fail to establish
credibility with speciﬁc stakeholders when management actions
do not align with their expectations. Thus, signaling a ﬁrm’s
willingness, or efforts to give stakeholders some input into the
development of its practices, constitutes an important prerequi-
site for constructing credibility (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013;
Iansen-Rogers and Oelschlaegel, 2005; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Also,
as ‘perceived’ accountability aligns with ‘expected’ accountability,
more accurate and responsive information about ﬁrm performance
is likely forthcoming, often with third-parties such as NGOs com-
menting on the quality of such efforts (Deegan et al., 2006; O’Dwyer,
2011). Doing so provides evidence that accepted techniques and
procedures were employed, enhancing a ﬁrm’s “procedural legit-
imacy” (i.e., it is doing things correctly) and allowing the ﬁrm
to beneﬁt from the “personal legitimacy” of independent par-
ties whose objective judgment is included in the report (O’Dwyer
et al., 2011; O’Dwyer, 2011). Ultimately, a positive misalignment
between ‘perceived’ accountability and ‘expected’ accountability is
expected to yield diminishing returns, as salient stakeholders are
already fully satisﬁed based on the material, reliable and complete
account offered by the ﬁrm.
P6. As perceived accountability increasingly aligns with expected
accountability, stakeholder credibility is expected to increase.
Establishing credibility in the relationship with diverse stake-
holder groups can be seen as an order-winning criterion, yielding
higher revenues via stronger stakeholder willingness-to-pay or
reduced stakeholder punishment (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013).
These outcomes have attracted attention from investors, who are
beginning to recognize the materiality of non-ﬁnancial factors, as
evidenced by the growth of socially responsible investment funds
(Ambec and Lanoie, 2008). In essence, credibility has the potential
10 J. Gualandris et al. / Journal of Operatio
Table 3
The link with competitive advantage
Outcomes Derivative
competitive
advantage
Risk avoidance based on objective
drivers:
–  Effective judgment of the availability
and quality of natural resources along
the supply chain;
– Objective judgment of supply chain
partners’ operations;
– Integrated thinking and anticipation.
Preserving brand value
(e.g., image) and taking
advantage of delays,
distortions and
disruptions affecting
competitors’
operations.
Efﬁciency based on objective drivers:
–  Managerial awareness pointing to
targeted improvements;
– Transferred costs;
– Richer set of ideas and options
resulting in lower cost solutions;
Competing as a low
cost provider or
pursuing aggressive
growing strategies.
Credibility based on perceptual
drivers:
– Effort to give stakeholders input into
the process;
– Procedural legitimacy supported by
independent parties;
–  Personal legitimacy offered by
independent parties.
Securing a continued
inﬂow of revenues via
stronger stakeholder
willingness to pay or
attenuated stakeholder
punishment.
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eo increase stakeholders’ conﬁdence and, in turn, safeguard a ﬁrm’s
xistence through a continued inﬂow of revenues (Table 3).
. Implications for theory and practice
.1. Theoretical implications
As we seek to expand our understanding of monitoring prac-
ices for more sustainable supply chains, our integrative conceptual
odel prompts a number of challenging considerations. First, the
ccounting literature suggests that sustainable monitoring can be
uch more than a set of evaluative activities (Awaysheh and
lassen, 2010). Focal ﬁrms can deploy a set of interdependent eval-
ation and veriﬁcation processes to create internal and external
ransparency about supply chain operations and performance, and
n turn impact perceptions of stakeholder accountability. First, per-
ormance evaluation occurs, relative to objectives expected of the
rm by its stakeholders (Lamberton, 2005). Second, veriﬁcation
ollows to enhance the degree of conﬁdence of the ﬁrm and its
takeholders about the evaluation outcome (Manetti and Becatti,
009; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Thus, future studies should incorpo-
ate the notion of veriﬁcation, which represents a departure from
rior SSCM research in regards to monitoring.
Second, our study suggests that sustainable monitoring can be
uch more than a self-managed set of narrowly focused evaluation
nd veriﬁcation processes. Indeed, some stakeholder groups can
lay central roles in SEV design and execution (Cooper and Owen,
007; Edgley et al., 2010; Owen and O’Dwyer, 2005), such as being
counselors’ or ‘advisors’. Thus, monitoring systems are expected
o vary between ﬁrms and supply chains in terms of inclusivity,
cope and disclosure (Ball et al., 2000; Manetti and Toccafondi,
012; Perego and Kolk, 2012). The design and execution of evalua-
ion and veriﬁcation processes require complex and unstructured
ecision-making, guided by accounting principles of materiality,
eliability, accuracy, completeness and responsiveness (Adams and
vans, 2004). Future studies can build on this stakeholder-centric
erspective to empirically assess whether (and how) the pres-
nce of which stakeholders in supply chain decision-making affectsns Management 38 (2015) 1–13
these accounting principles, as well as scope and disclosure. More-
over, it would be interesting to observe how focal ﬁrms leverage
inclusivity to learn and deﬁne optimal task-based rules to enhance
the development of sustainable supply chains.
Third, SSCM research presents sustainable monitoring as an
order qualiﬁer, an arm’s-length practice that evaluates compli-
ance with a voluntary code of conduct or regulatory standard. For
instance, Locke et al. (2007) argued that sustainable monitoring
alone does not translate into environmental and social enhance-
ments throughout the supply chain. Building on this perspective,
our synthesis indicates that limited beneﬁts are likely to occur with
self-managed, narrowly focused monitoring. Taken further, com-
petitive advantage is generated by an SEV system with targeted
inclusion, managed scope, and responsive disclosure of material
information. Such an SEV system can provide insights into potential
risks and inefﬁciencies (Egels-Zanden and Lindholm, 2014; Reed
et al., 2009), while also representing a powerful means to reduce
the imbalance between “what a ﬁrm does” and “what a ﬁrm should
do” (González-Benito et al., 2011) and close the gap between “provi-
sion of” and “needs for” information (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013;
Gray et al., 2006; Iansen-Rogers and Oelschlaegel, 2005). As SEV
systems work to increasingly align perceived and expected stake-
holder accountability, ﬁrms can access and leverage stakeholders’
legitimacy and consequently boost their credibility (Manetti and
Toccafondi, 2012; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Reed, 2008). However, the
development of an SEV system might be pushed too far, hurting
efﬁciency with overly complex stakeholder engagement, excessive
overhead, and slow decision-making. Stakeholder credibility might
also be weakened due to reduced perceived accountability and ﬁnal
misalignment with a stakeholder’s expectations.
By applying the lenses of Institutional Stakeholder Theory
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Mitchell et al., 1997), our conceptual model clar-
iﬁes the antecedents of SEV systems and, implicitly warns about the
following paradox: inclusivity is expected to develop to a lower
extent in contexts where it would provide greater beneﬁts to the
focal ﬁrm and all its stakeholders. In cases where focal ﬁrms main-
tain poor technical capabilities and operate in highly disconnected
networks, material environmental and social risks caused by lack
of control and free-riding likely exist in the extended supply chain
(Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Vurro et al., 2009). Similarly, poor
environmental or social performance is less likely to be objectively
acknowledged if a focal ﬁrm’s supply chain partners are highly
interconnected and opportunism occurs (Awaysheh and Klassen,
2010; Hirsch and Meyer, 2010; Villena et al., 2011). Under these
circumstances, inclusivity is expected to offer important beneﬁts
as it brings objectivity, expertise and connections to bear when
establishing metrics, conducting audits and validating information.
Nevertheless, based on earlier propositions (P2a,b and P4), focal
ﬁrms in these circumstances are expected to design and execute
SEV systems in isolation, with limited scope and disclosure. Here,
further theoretical and empirical investigation is needed in order
to reﬁne our understanding of this paradox and verify its existence.
5.2. Managerial implications
Our model points to a number of changes in the way SSCM pro-
fessionals might align and leverage accountability to stakeholders.
First, others have observed that managers tend to perceive that
multiple stakeholder groups tend to impose similar sustainabil-
ity demands (Murillo-Luna et al., 2008). However, our synthesis
indicates that managers might be better advised to invest more
resources to proactively reﬂect on the differences among expecta-
tions and informational needs of multiple and diverse stakeholder
groups. Because stakeholder groups might have dissimilar ethi-
cal and cultural characteristics, competing interests and diverse
sustainability demands can emerge, and managers might inadver-
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ently overlook the most important demands (Hall and Vredenburg,
003; Edgley et al., 2010).
Second, managers must be cautious about imposing self-
anaged, narrowly focused monitoring processes simply to reduce
pparent chaos and complexity arising from diverse and compet-
ng stakeholders’ demands (Ball et al., 2000; Adams and Evans,
004; Gray, 2013). Also, neither high external integration, nor
ear of punishment by stakeholders should translate into manage-
ial defensiveness and limited inclusivity (O’Dwyer et al., 2011).
roader stakeholder engagement – where knowledge sharing is
ought and dialogue is guided by principles of materiality, reli-
bility, accuracy, completeness and responsiveness – can create
tructure and clarity from complexity (Connolly and Hyndman,
013). Inclusivity can facilitate the identiﬁcation of environmen-
al and social issues in the supply chain before they become critical
Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012; Reed, 2008), and reduce the lack
f knowledge of some stakeholders about what needs to be done
or timely evaluation and veriﬁcation (Edgley et al., 2010). Such
n inclusive SEV design can create a learning process for the ﬁrm
nd its stakeholders, with opportunities for mutual understanding
nd reciprocal adjustments in perceptions (Perego and Kolk, 2012;
dgley et al., 2011; Reed et al., 2009 Reed et al., 2009).
Third, managers should be aware of the potential implications
f using their own personnel or outsourcing SEV execution to con-
ultants, accountants, and other supply chain partners. Any of these
gents might lack sufﬁcient technical knowledge and might uncrit-
cally verify the outcome of the evaluative task (Perego and Kolk,
012). Attention needs to be paid to the challenging relationship
etween these agents and their principal (managers): if “left out
f the game”, stakeholder groups might interpret the lack of exter-
al transparency as concealing opportunism and punish the ﬁrm
ith an unfavorable accountability score (Ball et al., 2000; Owen
t al., 2000; Manetti and Beccatti, 2009). Supply chain managers,
hus, could devote signiﬁcant attention toward establishing rela-
ionships with stakeholder groups that have the ability to perform
imely and effective evaluation and veriﬁcation assignments. To
uarantee that the general public and supply chain partners will
erceive such ‘counselors’ as legitimate, fair and reliable, managers
lso can obtain advice from stakeholder groups serving as ‘coor-
inators’. For many managers, rethinking and assigning roles for
peciﬁc stakeholder groups is a dramatic change in SEV execution,
ith stakeholders taking active roles, such as the appointment of
uditors, coordination of ﬁeldwork, and implementation of veriﬁ-
ation processes (Adams and Evans, 2004).
The issue of who participates in SEV design and execution
s central; thus, we must remind managers that high inclusivity
f diverse stakeholders might not always achieve strong stake-
older accountability and yield a competitive advantage. Inclusivity
hould differ between ﬁrms and between supply chains based on
he material externalities they generate. SEV design must involve
hose (diverse) stakeholder groups that purposely aim to con-
ribute to dialogue focused on constructing a valid and reliable
ystem (Edgley et al., 2010; Reed et al., 2009), rather than just
ndiscriminately involving more stakeholder groups. Ideally, SEV
xecution must have involvement of those salient stakeholders
hat have developed complementary capabilities and are capable
f adding credibility to the system (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). In other
ords, an SEV system must be ﬂexible in its inclusivity, as well
s in its consequential scope and disclosure, as these should be
et in an attempt to guarantee materiality, reliability, accuracy,
ompleteness and responsiveness. Besides avoiding risks and dis-
overing inefﬁciencies in the supply chain, the objective is to align
erceptions with expectations of stakeholder accountability (Ball
t al., 2000; Connolly and Hyndman, 2013; González-Benito et al.,
011).ns Management 38 (2015) 1–13 11
6. Conclusions
Focal ﬁrms exposed to a range of environmental and social
concerns are attempting to address both the informational needs
and performance expectations of multiple stakeholder groups. To
align and leverage accountability to stakeholders, a synthesis of the
accounting and SSCM literatures indicate that monitoring systems
must recognized as more complex and diverse sustainable evalu-
ation and veriﬁcation (SEV) systems, with multiple processes and
dimensions. On one hand, SEV systems can combine the activities
of data collection and processing, with veriﬁcation of the mate-
riality, reliability, accuracy, completeness and responsiveness of
any data and resulting information. On the other hand, such pro-
cesses can differ in terms of the degree to which diverse stakeholder
groups are engaged, the range of environmental and social issues
assessed, the breadth of the supply chain network captured, and
the extent of appropriate information ﬁnally reported to all stake-
holders. Notably, it is not only the absolute level that matters, but
also the alignment of the ﬁrm’s accountability, as perceived by key
stakeholders, with their expectations. These SEV dimensions tend
to be driven by ﬁrm capabilities, stakeholder salience and supply
chain integration. While further empirical research is desperately
needed, the model of SEV proposed here provides a clearer con-
ceptual foundation for building speciﬁc measures, understanding
complex relationships, and integrating additional theory.
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